The Cyprus Problem within
the context of the European Union
Stelios
Georgiades
September
2006
In
April 2004, the Annan Plan (5th version) was presented as the
“best possible” proposition by the United Nations for the “Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”. In a Referendum
held on 24 April 2004, while 76% of the Greek Cypriots rejected this plan,
65% of those living in the occupied territory (that is Turkish Cypriots
but also the 115,000 illegal Turkish settlers) voted in favour of the
plan.
In
brief, the Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots because it 1)
cleared Turkey of all responsibility and guilt for the invasion and
occupation of Cyprus, 2) failed to ensure the return of all Greek-Cypriot
refugees to their homes and properties, 3) crystallized the division
within the country rather than uniting the country, 4) permitted all
115,000 Turkish colonists to remain on the island, 5) created an unwieldy,
costly and essentially unworkable system of three legislatures, with a
veto formula where the 9% (one half of the 18% Turks) could hold the 91%
hostage, 6) gave Turkey the right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus,
even within the “Greek Cypriot constituent state”, thus undermining
the sovereignty of the country, and 7) demanded the dissolution of the
Cypriot National Guard, but allowed the presence of Turkish troops in
perpetuity.
Turkey’s
accession talks with the European Union are currently under way. The
Republic of Cyprus, now a full member of the European Union, although
unpleased with the ongoing occupation of its territory by Turkish troops,
has yet to VETO Turkey’s talks with the Union. After the collapse of the
2004 negotiations, the fate of the Cyprus problem has been “linked”
with Turkey’s European prospects. A potential accession of Turkey into
the EU will most likely require a resolution of the Cyprus Problem prior
to being implemented. On the other hand, a potential deadlock in
Turkey’s European path will have unpredictable consequences for the
Cyprus Problem, but also for the stability and peace in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea.
Although the Cyprus Problem has been characterized by many diplomats as “an unclimbed mountain” there seems to be a window of opportunity between now and the time when Turkey’s European fate will be decided (10-12 years from now) for serious negotiations that could lead to a resolution. Both sides (i.e. Turkey and Cyprus) have reasons to strive for a resolution: Turkey trying to avoid making this an obstacle in its European path, and Cyprus, a full member of the EU, trying to end the illegal Turkish occupation of the island, which now constitutes European soil.
It is evident that the only common denominator, and potential motivating factor left between the two sides is the European Union. Therefore, any future negotiations, although could still be under the aegis of the United Nations, should be seriously and officially backed by the European Union. The EU has to: 1) publicly acknowledge that the Cyprus Problem is now a European Problem, 2) study the Problem in relation to the EU acquis communautaire, and 3) take a well-planned, timely initiative for a fair and viable resolution of the Cyprus Problem.
