Dutch scholars on the 'new Macedonian question' (1991-1995)
by
Kees Klok
doctorandus/M.A. (Hist.)
The Dutch and the Greeks are geographically almost as far removed from
each other as Europe allows. Reading the press in both countries on the
problems which arose between Greece and FYROM, after the declaration of
the latter's independence, gives the impression that the distance between
these two members of the European Union is not only geographical. Whereas
most of the leading Dutch newspapers rigorously condemned Greek policy
towards FYROM, the Greek newspapers showed their indignance at another
expression of anti-Greek feeling by the supposedly Turkophile Dutch,
culminating in a short though hardly effective boycott of Dutch products
in Greece.
The leading question of this article however will not deal with the
contents of Dutch press comments on the 'new Macedonian question' by which
term I label the conflict between Greece and FYROM during the 1991-1995
period, but rather what views are expressed by Dutch historiography on the
matter. Before doing so we must define what publications we reckon to
belong to Dutch historiography, the more so as they are relatively small
in number.
At the moment this article is written the 'new Macedonian question' or
subjects related to it, are treated in a book (Detrez, 1992) and some
thirteen articles in various periodicals. Some of these articles come down
to short comments only, others are well written analyses. The criteria for
including them in this article are that they must have been written by an
expert, preferably a historian or a scholar well aware of the history of
the area and they must have been published in a magazine seriously dealing
with history, Modern Greek studies or foreign relations.
However limited Dutch historiography on our subject may be, it is of
interest to see what scholarly views are expressed and how these relate to
those of the journalists that play a major role in the construction of
public opinion. Particularly since these were, with an odd exception,
marching in line with the ranks of the British and German press against
Greece.
Obviously none of the authors treat the 'new Macedonian question' as a new
phenomenon, but all of them trace its roots back to the foundation of
Tito's Yugoslavia immediately after World War II. Particularly Wim van
Loon points out the importance of a historical perspective, since in his
view history plays a dominant role in all conflicts in the Balkans. The
importance of a relation between history and politics, according to Van
Loon, is much more realized in the minds of Balkan politicians as in those
of their Western counterparts, which is the cause of a rift between the
former and the latter which should not be underestimated (Van Loon, 13).
With the founding of 'Macedonia' as an autonomous entity within Yugoslavia
the Macedonian question entered an entirely new phase, as for the first
time in history 'Macedonian' nationalism was allowed to develop freely, it
was even officially encouraged with the aim of weakening Serbia on the one
hand and by strengthening Yugoslavian claims on Bulgarian and Greek
Macedonia on the other (Klok, 1996, SH 31/2, 59; Van den Heuvel, 1994, IS
48/10, 488; Van Loon, 13; De Boel, 34). This second aspiration of Tito is
seen as one of the reasons for his support of the Greek left in the civil
war which devastated the country until 1949 (Koolschijn, 302).
When Yugoslav Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 the effects of
the process of nation-building became evident. In the new state extreme
nationalism had taken root in the shape of the VMRO-DPMNE headed by a
young poet, Ljubko Georgievski. In the eyes of some of the authors the
virulent nationalism preached by this party was one, perhaps the most
important reason for the Greeks to grow alarmed at the prospect of an
independent neighbour with the name Macedonia. VMRO-DPMNE called for the
unification of Greek, Bulgarian and former Yugoslav Macedonia. An idea
which, though it was not loudly expressed after the late forties,
according to Van den Heuvel, has never been officially abandoned by the
Yugoslav Communist Party, although it recognized the Slavs of Yugoslav
Macedonia as a nation (Van den Heuvel, 1994, IS 48/10, 489). Van den
Heuvel also points out that the fact that 'Macedonia' was on good terms
with Turkey made it a prime suspect in the eyes of Athens.
Van Loon does not mention the radicals in Skopje with so many words, but
according to him there were two factors which helped to arouse Greek fears
for the safety of its territorial integrity: persistent 'Macedonian'
propaganda, which was largely the work of radical nationalists, and the
use of Greek symbols by Skopje (Van Loon, 13). 'Macedonia,' says Van Loon,
constituted a threat to stability in the Balkans by the simple fact that
stronger states would be able to take advantage of its weakness. He sees
the speedy recognition of the new state by Bulgaria and Turkey as an
ominous sign. He does not give a clear answer to the question whether
Greek fears were justified or not, but he states that whatever the answer
might be, these fears played a major role in Greek policy making (Van
Loon, 13). He also notes an internal danger to Greece: the fact that the
Macedonia-crisis could stimulate the growth of radical nationalism, which
could have a serious impact on the freedom of the press
and the treatment of minorities (Van Loon, 14).
Koolschijn, like Van Loon, shows much understanding for the Greek
position. Going back to the late forties he writes that the Greek civil
war was encouraged by Tito with the specific aim of Yugoslavia laying
hands on Greek Macedonia (Koolschijn, 302). Looking at the historical
perspective he considers Greek sensitivities about the flag and the
constitution of Skopje absolutely understandable. Like Van Loon and Klok
he points out the effect of over forty years of propaganda emanating from
Skopje and directed against Greece and like Klok he remarks that the
Gligorov administration never reacted against this propaganda which
continued after 1991 (Koolschijn, 303; Klok, 1996, SH 31/2, 61).
Koolschijn stresses the importance of the VMRO-DPMNE in bringing the
ancient phantoms of territorial claims back to life, while he accuses the
government in Skopje of 'encouraging the nationalist fire' (Koolschijn,
303) Like Van Loon he sees FYROM as a destabilizing factor, particularly
in view of Bulgaria which he thinks is still harboring 'revisionist
intentions' towards 'Macedonia.'
De Boel regards the re-founding of the old VMRO in its new shape of
VMRO-DPMNE as another step in the process of increasing 'Macedonian'
nationalism, a phenomenon he dates back to the eighties. He points out the
importance of the role of what he calls 'the absurd intolerance of the
Slavo-Macedonians' towards Greeks making use of the name Macedonia, which
in his opinion is rightfully Greek. He notes that after 1950 Yugoslav
Macedonia pretended to be the one and only heir of the Ancient Macedonia
of Philip and Alexander. According to De Boel both Belgrade and Skopje
stressed again and again the existence of a 'Macedonian' minority in
Greece and Bulgaria. In his view this was not only to divert attention
from economic problems, but also to keep territorial claims alive. To
preserve good relations with Yugoslavia the Greeks swallowed their anger
and kept a low profile (De Boel, 34-36).
Detrez on the other hand strongly criticizes the Greeks for their
treatment of the Slav Macedonian minority. However, despite this harsh
treatment, and possibly because of it, he detects a strong Slav-Macedonian
consciousness amongst some of the Slavs in Greek Macedonia. He views
'Macedonian' nationalism, inspired by the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia, and the negative prospect of having to live in a Serbian state as
the main factors for Skopje's break-away from Yugoslavia. He is not
impressed by Greek historical arguments against the name of the new state,
though somewhat more by Greek fears that 'Macedonia' will use the
Slav-Macedonian presence in Greek Macedonia as an argument for claims on
Greek territory (Detrez, 1992, 149-161).
Looking at Greece Kapteijn and Klok stress the importance of the 'foreign
factor' in Greek policy. For most of its existence Greece has been
subjected to Great Power politics as well as to an almost continuous
threat of attack from abroad (Kapteijn, 8). The 'foreign factor' has
created a deep feeling of distrust in Greece, not only of its direct
neighbors, but particularly of its own allies. The policy of the USA and
NATO on the Cyprus-issue is perceived by the Greeks as directed against
their interests and as proof of bad faith if not right-out betrayal. Since
the late seventies therefore the Greeks show an inclination to follow
their own way in foreign policy, sometimes regardless of their allies,
which has brought them several times at loggerheads with the rest of the
EU (Klok, 1994, 10-11).
Greek distrust of its neighbors and allies was heightened by the threat
felt from the north and by the lack of understanding and support
experienced as public opinion on the conflicts with FYROM in many W.
European countries turned against Athens. This was very much the case in
The Netherlands. Not knowing much about the historical background of Greek
politics the Dutch press, with its innate inclination to rush to the aid
of any country (except perhaps Serbia) which successfully presents itself
as an underdog, criticized the Greeks strongly over 'Macedonia.' With the
exception only of one or two journalists who upheld a dissident opinion,
notably Frans van Hasselt, Athens correspondent of the NRC-Handelsblad.
Although Van den Heuvel recognized the existence in the past of a Yugoslav
claim on Greek Macedonia he states in a post-scriptum to Koolschijn's
article that present-day FYROM has abandoned this claim and that Greek
policy towards it did not seem to be a very sensible one. He sees the
policy of non-recognition and the 1994 embargo as destabilizing factors in
the area (Van den Heuvel, 1994, IS 48/6, 304). Although Klok shows
understanding for the boycot insofar as he thinks that, besides Greek
frustration caused by the USA's recognition of FYROM and the need to
satisfy public opinion, Skopje's intransigence was important in bringing
it about, he tends to agree with Van den Heuvel that it was not a very
sensible policy as it particularly damaged Greece's reputation abroad. On
the other hand it appeared to be a factor in reaching a break-through in
Greek - 'Macedonian' relations (leading to the interim-accord of 1995),
together with the waning popularity of VMRO-DPMNE which gave the
Gligorov administration some room to maneuver.
He also points out that 'Macedonia' did everything to present itself to
Europe as the underdog which was bullied by Greece. This resulted in
pressure being put on Greece by the EU to adopt a more lenient attitude
towards its neighbor, who initially did little to improve the situation.
This was mainly due to the popularity of the VMRO-DPMNE which was the
largest opposition party at the time. Even though the EU at its meeting in
Lisbon (June 1992) decided to back Greece, some members, including The
Netherlands, remained critical of Athens. However, US and EU mediation
brought about a small break-through in April 1993, when 'Macedonia' was
admitted to the United Nations under the provisional name of Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Klok, 1996, SH 31/2, 61).
Van Loon writes that at first Greece's fierce opposition against the name
of the new republic was considered to be exaggerated and unrealistic by
the EU. Quite surprisingly the EU finally backed Greece, because,
according to Van Loon, the future of a united Europe was not to be put at
a risk (Van Loon, 13).
Kapteijn remarks that Dutch support for EU-recognition of 'Macedonia'
meant that Greek distrust of Holland reached its maximum. This distrust
originated from the 1986 Dutch presidency of the EU (then still EC), when
The Hague took the initiative to re-activate relations with Turkey. To the
annoyance of Greece the Dutch considered Turkey of great importance to the
defense of Western-Europe. They regarded the Greek attitude towards
'Macedonia' as fanatic and nationalistic. The Dutch, who were under no
threat from any neighbor, did not understand Greek feelings of national
awareness and foreign threat, whereas the Greeks showed no understanding
for the characteristical Dutch attitude of wanting to lecture the rest of
the world. Even though, as Kapteijn pointedly remarks, this characteristic
was the driving force behind Dutch efforts against the Greek junta in the
1967-74 period (Kapteijn, 9).
Greece's struggle against recognition of FYROM under the name Macedonia
met in general with little sympathy in the Dutch press. Greece's appeal to
history fell on deaf ears. Also the way it operated within the EU was
characterized as some kind of blackmail and it was accused of endangering
peace and stability in the region by bullying little 'Macedonia' to
confirm to its wishes. Particularly the 1994 boycott was widely condemned.
Compared to this view the scholarly writings on the problem show a
somewhat different attitude. Although there is no unanimous understanding
for Greece's appeal to history, most of the writers do show understanding
for Greek fears about its territorial integrity. Particularly the memory
of the very real Yugoslavian territorial claims of the forties and the
ongoing propaganda from Skopje carry weight.
Although none of the writers contest the right of FYROM to exist as an
independent state, some are quite critical about the role of Skopje,
attributing to it at least part of the blame for the escalation of the
conflict, though showing some understanding for the difficult position of
the Gligorov-administration. The role played by VMRO-DPMNE is generally
viewed as a negative influence. That of the EU is noted as somewhat
remarkable: despite fierce criticism of Greece by some EU-member, notably
Italy and The Netherlands, the Union finally supported Greece but
maintained pressure on Athens to adopt a more lenient attitude towards
FYROM. EU mediation partly contributed to admission of Skopje to the UN.
There is some understanding for the Greek irritations which led to the
1994 boycott. However this measure is mainly viewed as having led to a
considerable loss of Greek prestige, even though it contributed towards
reaching the Interim Accord of 1994.
Few authors deal with the problem of the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece. It
is mainly Detrez who writes critically about Greek treatment of this
minority, which is not recognized by the Greeks as such.
Finally there is some attention for the 'foreign factor' in Greek history
and its effect on Greek foreign policy, while one author (Kapteijn)
elaborates on the difference in perceptions and mentality of Greeks and
Dutch, which might serve as an example for Greece's relations with the EU.
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