The
nature of Greek Cypriot intransigence.
By Dr P C Afxentiou.
NO clear-cut demarcation lines are easily recognized nowadays in
Cyprus among the political parties or groups of people with respect
to their political views. The blurred positions reflect changes in
the political landscape and differing sense of justice that colour
the perceptions of the Cyprus problem. In a highly confused
atmosphere and a strongly charged emotional environment, what is
rational and what is extreme end up being a matter of choice
determined largely in the eye of the beholder. Statements or
initiatives by the government, viewed as innocuous to some, become
anathema to others. As a rule, carelessness is unforgiving, as shown
repeatedly in the history of negotiations.
It is a fact of tactics that negotiations always begin with the
opponents parading their maximalist positions, and a process of
mutual concessions gradually evolves from which a solution, not
infrequently, follows. In Cyprus, where traditional procedures,
customarily overlooked, once again have been violated in a misguided
gesture of goodwill by President Christofias, to accept a rotation of
presidency and legitimize 50,000 Turkish settlers. This gesture
quickly gave the opportunity, or was used as an excuse, to certain
Greek Cypriots, viewed by some as extremists, to harden their position.
Hardliners unintentionally provided grounds for Turkish propaganda to
reiterate shamelessly that the Greeks do not want a solution. Beyond
this distortion of reality, those among the hardliners who, in the
past, were members of the treasonous EOKA B, present an ugly picture
domestically, no less harmful than the international
misrepresentation of Turkey. Excepting this group, the rest of the
hardliners, who may be classified as disciples of Tassos Papadopulos
or Vassos Lyssarides, cannot be dismissed as dreamers but should be
treated with respect as their arguments are not feeble but firmly
based on valid constitutional principles. Though their arguments are
unlikely to change Turkish intransigence, they might influence
foreign governments and the international press, those foreign
citizens who abide by law and believe in justice, and generally all
those whose moral integrity prevent them from hiding behind the
obscurantism of murky national interests. If nothing else, Cyprus
expects tangible support from the European Union and cooperation from
its members who are bound by the treaties they signed, and which
Turkey openly ridicules.
One does not need to be a hardliner in order to bring to the
attention of the world the Turkish mentality toward treaties.
Historically, Turkey practically never has honoured the treaties it
has signed. Some historical examples, with emphasis on Hellenism,
will shed some light on this issue.
The Constitution of Cyprus was imposed by Greece and Turkey and co-
signed by England. To what extent Archbishop Markarios was briefed
fully by Konstantinos Karamanlis and Evangelos Averof still remains
unclear. The Treaties of London, bearing the signs of possible Greek
government misinformation and entrapment of Makarios, are grand
manifestations of political short sightedness and cowardice unworthy
of a protector of Greek Cypriot interests. Despite being biased in
favour of Turkish Cypriots, Turkey threw them into the wastepaper
basket as obstacles to its aspiring expansionism which it implements
with illegal settlement of people in Cyprus from its mainland.
With respect to intervention rights, it is emphasized that the
Treaties of London provide the right to intervention if undertaken by
all three guarantors together, and only for the purpose of re-
establishing the status quo ante. Contrary to Turkish arguments,
according to constitutional experts, the constitution does not
provide the right to unilateral intervention. Had it so provided, by
analogy, the intervention would serve the same purpose. Consequently,
Turkey might have claimed the right to intervene had it re-instated
the Makarios presidency. The Turkish position is rendered farcically
inconsistent, given that, on one hand, Turkey claims that its
intervention was based on the Constitution of Cyprus, whereas, on the
other hand, she does not recognize the very same Constitution which
gave her the right to intervene. The de facto occupation of northern
Cyprus violates another treaty, namely the 1929 Treaty of Lausanne,
by which Turkey resigned any sovereign right to Cyprus, and this
violation is, of course, ignored as well.
The overall conclusion derived from the Turkish attitude toward
treaties is that they represent temporary arrangements to be broken
promptly when the appropriate opportunity arises.
Going further back to the Ottoman Empire, its treaty obligations of
local government reforms and protection of its subjects irrespective
of religion or race, never were carried out. The Armenian massacres
of 1894-1898 and the Armenian genocide of 1915 are striking cases in
this respect. For Hellenism the reader should also be reminded of the
1825 barbarism of Imbrahim in Morea that forced the hand of England,
France, and Russia whose concerted naval and army intervention led to
the independence of Greece as provided by the 1829 Treaty of London.
The citation of the above examples, along with a fuller examination
of the history regarding the systematic Turkish violations of
treaties, should be expected to swell the ranks of what various
people consider to be hardliners. Based on history and the Cyprus
experience, who amongst civilized individuals would fault those Greek
Cypriots who refuse the so called Turkish guarantees of Cyprus
sovereignty and who demand the withdrawal of Turkish troops from
Cyprus? Who can really blame the Greek Cypriots for not being
prepared, if possible, ever to have anything to with Turkey? However,
before all Greek Cypriots run away with enthusiasm and join the
hardliners, let them also keep in mind that history provides many
examples of disputes which were resolved by the force of guns.
Justice often comes face to face with the brute power of guns. The
powerful, unfortunately even today, continue to brandish their
weaponry, impose their own form of justice, and cover their actions
with laughable and empty rhetoric of imaginary threatened national
interest, visible as a ghost exclusively to the converted-themselves.
Ghosts have no room in philosophy nor should they in politics. To
Plato, and more so to Socrates, abstract thought and rationality, the
pillars of philosophy, had to be strengthened by morality and the
sense of justice. These attributes, if incorporated in an agreement
between the two constituencies, would bring peace, and allow
democratic principles to function free from vexing suspicions,
religious extremism and chauvinistic racism.
Dr P C Afxentiou is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University
of Calgary in Canada
